





















When a public good is excludable it is possible to charge individuals for using the good. 
We study the role of prices on excludable public goods within an extension of the Stern-
Stiglitz version of the Mirrlees optimal income tax model. Our discussion includes both 
the case where the public good is a final consumer good and the case where it is an 
intermediate good.  
We demonstrate that for a public consumer good charging a positive price may be 
desirable, but only under certain conditions. However, charging a lower than optimal 
price may be less efficient than setting a zero price. Conditions are identified under which 
consumers should be rationed in their demand rather than adjusting demand to price. We 
also conclude that producers using an intermediate public good as an input should not be 
charged a positive price.  
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 1. Introduction 
 
In many countries there is growing concern about the size of public budgets and a search 
for alternatives to tax funding. Since excludable public goods are by definition such that 
it is possible to charge a price or fee for their use, even the well established case for free 
provision of public goods is being challenged in the case of excludable public goods. In 
this paper we shall address the provision of such goods.  
  There are many important examples of excludable public goods. Information is in 
general a public good and often it can be made excludable. Patent rights is one way to 
exclude. For information that is only of value in the fairly short term, like meteorological 
and hydrological forecasts, it would probably be easy to exclude people and only let 
those who subscribe to the service have access to the information. The services provided 
by the Central Bureau of Statistics is another example of information that can easily be 
made excludable. Radio and television broadcasts, many services provided on the internet 
and non-congested roads, public beaches, national parks and museums are some other 
examples of excludable public goods.  
There are several questions that are of interest to study. First, if there is public 
provision, should it then be financed by an income tax or should it be partly, or 
completely, financed by a fee (price).
3 If the price instrument is indeed used, will this 
lead to more or less provision of the public good as compared to the situation without 
exclusion ? Second, since it is possible to have market provision of excludable public 
goods by private firms, there is the important issue of whether public or private provision 
is preferable. Third, some excludable public goods can be regarded as final consumer 
goods. However, goods, like statistics or other information, have more the character of an 
intermediate good. It is conceivable that the rules for provision would depend on whether 
the excludable public good is a final consumer good or an intermediate good. We will not 
attempt to answer all these questions.  We will focus on public provision of an excludable 
public good. However, we will consider both the case where the public good is a final 
consumer good and the case where it is an intermediate public good.  In either case the 
central issue is the welfare effect of charging a price.    2 
Empirically there are examples both of publicly provided, excludable public 
goods being financed from general tax revenue and goods partly financed by prices.  
Weather forecasts are in many countries publicly provided and financed out of general 
tax revenue.  Many forms of statistics are publicly provided and financed out of general 
tax revenue. However, there are examples, like Sweden, where recently substantial 
charges have been introduced for users to get access to Central Bureau of Statistics data.   
  There is a vast literature on public and/or private provision of nonexcludable 
public goods. However, public provision of excludable public goods has not been much 
studied. Of course, the first best rule does not depend on whether the public good is 
excludable or not. In a second best setting it may be different since there is one more 
instrument, a price on the public good, available when the public good is excludable. 
Fraser (1996) studied provision of excludable public goods. However, in his model the 
incomes are exogenous and there are no distortions from the income tax. There are 
several papers that have studied market provision of excludable public goods by private 
firms. Oakland (1974) studied a model where private firms operating under conditions of 
perfect competition provide an excludable public good. Brito and Oakland (1980) and 
Burns and Walsh (1981) consider a situation where a natural monopoly provide an 
excludable public good.  
We believe it is important to acknowledge that taxes are not only used in order 
to finance public goods but also to achieve redistribution. We therefore use an extension 
of the Stiglitz-Stern version of the Mirrlees optimal income tax model.
4 We will assume 
there are two types of persons, high-skilled and low-skilled, and that it is desireable to 
redistribute from the high-skilled to the low-skilled. First considering the case where the 
public good is a final consumer good, we formulate the optimisation problem in section 
2, and then discuss the optimum price setting and public provision in section 3. The focus 
of that section is on the conditions under which non-zero prices would be part of the 
optimal provision scheme. In section 4 we consider the case where the public good is an 
intermediate good. Section 5 concludes.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
3 One benefit of using prices to finance an excludable public good is that data will be generated that might 
be useful to derive the users’ evaluation of the public good. In the analysis below we will not take this 
aspect into account. Hence, we will assume that individuals’ preferences are known. 
4 See Mirrlees (1971), Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982).   3 
2. The optimisation problem. 
 
The consumer enjoys one private good, one excludable public good and leisure.
5 When 
the public good is excludable one can charge individuals for accessing it. Depending on 
the technology for excluding individuals the payment scheme might take different forms. 
Here we assume individuals can be charged a non-negative price  q  per unit they 
cons ume. Let  2 , 1 , = i g
i  denote the quantity of the public good consumed by a person of 
type i and let 
i c  be the consumption of the private good. We normalize the price of the 
private good to one. Let  g denote the quantity of the publicly provided public good, 
which can be interpreted in different ways. We may think of g as measuring the degree of 
detail of, say, information or forecasts made available. It may measure hours of 
broadcasting transmission or opening hours of a museum. More generally, it may reflect 
different quality levels of a public good. Exclusion implies that a consumer may have 
access only to a part of g, say only some pieces of available information, only part of the 
television network or access for only a limited period. The amount made available to 
consumer i is subject to the restriction that  g gi £ .  We let 
i i i i Y w H L , , , and 
i B  denote 
leisure, hours of work, the wage rate, the before-tax and after-tax income of an individual 
of type i. 
i i H L Z + =  denotes the fixed time endowment.  Since 
i i i H w Y = , we can 
express 
i H  by 
i i w Y / .  
Before addressing the social optimisation problem we need to clarify the 
individual consumer behaviour. The utility maximisation problem for an individual will 
take the form: Max  ) / , , (
i i i i w Y c g U   s.t.   the budget constraint 
i i i B qg c = +  and the 
capacity constraint g gi £ .  We solve this problem step-wise. First, we condition on 
i i w Y /  and neglect the condition  g gi £ . Suppressing  i w  and instead indexing the 
                                                                   
5 By a public good we essentially mean a good that can be made available to all consumers at no real 
resource cost once it has been produced. There is no rivalry in consumption. In the analysis below we will 
consider a price on the excludable public good. For such a price to be meaningful it should not be possible 
to retrade the public good. Hence, there might well be public goods that in a technical sense are excludable, 
but where possibilities for retrade makes it like a nonexcludable public good. In some cases there may be a 
cost of distributing the good to the consumers. In our analysis charging a price may in such cases be 
interpreted as the setting of a price over and above such a cost. For simplicity, we shall abstract from such 
costs and normalize the cost of distributing the good to zero.   4 
demand functions we derive the notional conditional demand functions  ) , , ( ~ i i i Y B q c and 
) , , ( ~ i i i Y B q g . The effective demand is given by: 
) , , ( ~ ) , , , (
i i i i i i Y B q g g Y B q g =   if   g Y B q g
i i i £ ) , , ( ~  
and 
g g Y B q g
i i i = ) , , , (     if   g Y B q g
i i i ‡ ) , , ( ~ . 
We note that  1 =
i
g g  if  g g
i > ~  and that  0 =
i
g g  if  g g
i £ ~ . Also, if  g g
i > ~ , then 








q g g g g ,  where 
hi g  denotes Hicksian demand.  This implies that the 
Slutsky decomposition is still valid and can be used without any reservation about the 
case of rationing. We also note that Roy’s identity holds even if a person is rationed.
6   
Sticking  ) , , , ( g Y B q g
i i i  back into the direct utility function we obtain the conditional 
indirect utility function  ) , , / , ( g q w Y B V
i i i . If  g g
i £ ~ ,  0 =
i
g V 7. 
  Turning to the social optimisation problem, our concern will be with (information 
constrained) Pareto efficient policy. Even if our focus be  on the optimal price of the 
public good, we have to analyse the price setting within a wider optimisation problem 
that also involves income taxes. We assume a linear production technology and denote 
the producer price of the public good by p . Let 
1 N  and 
2 N  denote the number of type 
one and type two individuals, respectively. We assume 
1 2 w w > , and that the social 
planner wants to redistribute from the high-skilled to the low-skilled type. In pursuing 
such a policy the planner will face an asymmetric information constraint. We assume that 
                                                                   
6 If the person is rationed  g gi =  and  qg B c
i i - = . The indirect utility function is defined by 
) / , , ( ) , , / , ( w Y qg B g U g q w Y B V - ” .  Differentiating we obtain  ) / ( / c U g q V ¶ ¶ - = ¶ ¶  and 
) / / c U B V ¶ ¶ = ¶ ¶ .  It follows that  g B V q V = ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ - ) / /( ) / ( . 
7 We may note that  B c B U U V = = . It is also helpful to note that we can write  ) , , / , ( g q w Y B V
i i i  = 
) , / , (
i i i i i g w Y qg B U - . If the individual is rationed ( g g
i = ),  ) , , / , ( g q w Y B V
i i i   = 
) , / , ( g w Y qg B U





















is the marginal valuation of g in terms of private income. 
B g V V /  equals the 
individual’s valuation of g in terms of B minus the price q. If the individual is unconstrained, the valuation 
according to the utility function and as reflected by the market will of course be the same.   5 
the identity of the two types is private information that is hidden to the planner. Thus the 
policy must be chosen subject to the restriction that incomes intended for type one do not 
accrue to type two individuals  pretending to be of type one.
8  There is no reason to 
assume that there are systematic differences in preferences between high skill and low 
skill persons.  Differences in demand for the public good depend only on differences in 
leisure (work effort) and income. We will explore the Pareto efficient allocations by 
maximising the utility of person of type one for a given utility level of type two persons. 
The optimization problem, which defines Pareto efficient taxation and provision of the 
public good, takes the form:  
 
) , , , (
1 1 1
, , , , ,
2 2 1 1
g q Y B V Max
g q Y B Y B
              (1)   
    s.t.     
 
2 2 2 2 ) , , , ( V g q Y B V ‡              (2) 
  ) , , , ( ) , , , ( 1 1 2 2 2 g q Y B V g q Y B V m ‡                       (3) 
  0 ) ( ) ( ) (
2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 ‡ - + + - + - pg g N g N q B Y N B Y N     (4)   
The constraint (2) assigns a minimum utility level to individuals of type two. The 
constraint (3) is a self-selection constraint imposing that the vector of taxes, prices and 
level of g  be such that type two persons do not gain by mimicking type one persons, i.e. 
by choosing the income intended for the low-skilled type of person. We use an index m  
to denote the “mimicker”, i.e.  ) (
m V  is the utility of type two persons evaluated at the 
income point intended for type one persons. We assume the standard single crossing 
property that for any fixed gross and net income point in Y,B space the indifference curve 
                                                                   
8 We could also have included a self-selection constraint that an individual of type one should not mimick a 
type two person. However, one can show that at most one of the self-selection constraints is binding. We 
make the usual assumption that it is the self-selection constraint that the high skill person should not mimic 
the low skill person that is binding.    6 
of a low ability type of person is steeper than that of a high ability type
9.  In the analysis 
below we will also assume that q must be nonnegative. The government budget constraint 
is expressed by (4). It requires that revenue from income taxes and from charging a price 
on the public good is sufficient to finance the public good provision. 
 
3. Optimum price setting and public good provision. 
Before deriving the first order conditions for the optimization problem we can establish 
that it will never be optimal to choose a combination of price and provision such that no 
individual consumes the total amount of the public good. 
 
Proposition 1: An optimum is such that  } ~ , ~ max{
2 1 g g g £ . 
 
Proof: We construct a proof by contradiction. Suppose there exists an optimum such that 
} ~ , ~ max{
2 1 g g g > . Decrease the level of g down to  } ~ , ~ max{
2 1 g g . This will not harm any 
of persons one or two. It will not improve the situation of the mimicker, so the self-
selection constraint will not be affected. Take the resources released and give to the 
actual person 2. In this way we have achieved a Pareto improvement. Hence, the initial 
situation with  } ~ , ~ max{
2 1 g g g ‡  can not have been an optimum.  
 
 
The Lagrangean of the optimization problem above can be written as: 
       [ ]
2 2 2 2 1 1 1 ) , , , ( ) , , , ( V g q Y B V g q Y B V - + = L b [ ] ) , , , ( ) , , , (
1 1 2 2 2 g q Y B V g q Y B V
m - + r  
 
         [ ] ) ( ) ( ) (
2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 g N g N q pg B Y N B Y N + + - - + - + m  
 
                                                                   
9 That is, for any admissible values of B, Y, q, g the utility function   ) , , / , (
1 g q w Y B V will have a steeper 
indifference curve than   ) , , / , (
2 g q w Y B V  through a point B,Y in a diagram with Y measured along the 
horizontal and B along the vertical axis.   7 
The Lagrangean should be differentiated w.r.t.   g Y B Y B , , , ,
2 2 1 1  and q. We note that the 
problem formally has strong similarities with both the optimal commodity tax problem 
and the publicly provided private goods problem, but it is clearly a separate problem. The 
first order conditions are the following: 
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1 1 1 1





B B g qN N V V
B
m m r           (5) 
 
0
1 1 1 1





Y y g qN N V V
Y
m m r           (6) 
 
0
2 2 2 2 2
2 = + - + =
¶
L ¶
B B B g qN N V V
B
m m r b           (7) 
 
0
2 2 2 2 2
2 = + + + =
¶
L ¶
y y y g qN N V V
Y
m m r b           (8) 
 
0 ) (





g g g g g N g N q p V V V V
g
m m r r b     (9) 
 
) ( ) (
2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1
q q
m
q q q q g N g N q g N g N V V V V
q
+ + + + - + + =
¶
L ¶
m m r r b   (10) 
The requirement that  q is nonnegative implies that there might not exist a meaningful 
solution to  0 / = ¶ L ¶ q .  However, considering a case where the optimal value of  q is 
determined by an interior solution to  0 / = ¶ L ¶ q  we get: 
 
0 ) ( ) (





q q q q g N g N q g N g N V V V V
q
m m r r b     (11) 
 
We note that eqs. (5) – (8) and (10) formally look the same as in Edwards et al. (1994). 
However, note that there is only a formal similarity. In the present context individuals   8 
may be rationed and q must be nonnegative. This also means that we have to be careful 
when interpreting the first order conditions.  
Making use of Roy’s identity 
10 and the Slutsky equation; we can rewrite (10) as 
 
2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1










B B B B
g g qN g g qN g qN g qN g N
g N g V g V g V g V g V g V
q
- + - + + + +
+ - + + - - - =
¶
L ¶
m m m m m
m r r r r b
    (12) 
   
We then make use of (5) and (7) to eliminate terms: 
 
) ( ) (





B g N g N q g g V
q
+ + - =
¶
L ¶
m r            (13) 
 
If  0 / = ¶ L ¶ q  we get 
 
[ ] ) ( *
1 2 2 1 1 m h
q
h
q g g g N g N q - = + m                                      (14) 
 








The expression in brackets on the left-hand side of (14) is the sum of substitution effects, 
which is non-positive.  
Equation (14) expresses a trade-off between two effects. Consider the case in 
which the demand for  g is decreasing in labour and accordingly increasing in leisure 
( 0 ~ > L g ). If type one is not rationed  ) ~ (
1 g g < , the mimicker, enjoying more leisure, will 
be the larger buyer of g   ) (
1 m g g < , and the price q can be used to relax the self-selection 
constraint. By increasing q and lowering the income tax to make person one equally well 
off, the mimicker, incurring a larger real income loss from the price increase, will be 
made worse off and the self-selection constraint (3) is being relaxed. This effect is 
reflected by the right hand side of (14). This effect has to be traded off against the effect 
                                                                   
10 From Roy’s identity we know that 
i






q g g g g - = , where we use the superscript h to denote the Hicksian demand.  
   9 
on the left hand side which is the the distortionary effect of pricing the public good in a 
way which drives the consumption below the available amount of g.  
We shall now identify and characterise the respective optima of the various 
regimes that can materialise. In characterising different regimes it will be crucial how 
leisure, or labor supply, affects the marginal valuation of 
i g  and the demand 
i g ~ . It is 
helpful to elaborate a bit on this aspect before we pursue the optimum price implications.  
Let us consider an increase in leisure 
i L corresponding to a decrease in labor supply 
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<0  ￿ 
i
L g ~ <0. More 
leisure can have a positive effect on the marginal valuation of g  and induce a higher 
demand, or the effect can be zero or negative. For example more leisure can increase the 
marginal benefit of television programmes and make watching television more attractive. 
The case with  0 ~
L = g occurs if the direct utility function exhibits weak separability 
between leisure and  market goods. 
For the case of a zero or negative impact of leisure we can show the following 
result: 
 
Proposition 2: Nothing can be gained by a positive price on the excludable public good 
if  . 0 ~ £
i
L g  
 
Proof : To prove this proposition we will consider each of the cases  i.  0 ~ =
i
L g ;  and ii. 
0 ~ <
i
L g . 
 i.  0 ~ =
i
L g .  I n this case 
2 1 ~ ~ ~ g g g
m < = . From proposition 1 we know that 
2 ~ g g £ .  
Suppose first that 
2 1 ~ ~ g g g £ < , i.e., that the type one individual is unconstrained. This 
implies that the Hicksian substitution effect is negative. It follows from eq. (14) 
that . 0 = q  Suppose next that 
2 1 ~ ~ g g g < < . Since both types are constrained, eq. (14) is 
consistent with an infinity of possible values of q. Hence, q is indeterminate. However,   10 
q=0 is one optimum, and nothing can be gained by having a positive  q. To see this, 
consider an initial situation with  q>0.  Decreasing  q to zero and simultaneously 
decreasing 
1 B  and 
2 B  by the amounts  qg  the situation for both actual persons and the 
mimicker are unchanged.   
 
ii.  0 ~ <
i
L g .  In this case 
1 ~ ~ g g
m <  and 
2 ~ ~ g g
m < . However, we do not know how 
2 ~ g relate 
to 
1 ~ g .  We consider the various possibilities. a)
1 2 ~ ~ ~ g g g g
m £ < < . Eq. (14) then implies a 
negative  q. However, since this is not feasible  q has to be truncated to zero.  b) 
2 1 ~ ~ ~ g g g g
m £ < < . Eq. (14) implies a negative  q, which must be truncated to 0. c) 
1 2 ~ ~ ~ g g g g
m < < < . Both actual persons are constrained, so eq. (14) is indeterminate. 
However, suppose the optimum is such that q>0. Decrease  q  to zero and decrease 
1 B and 
2 B  with the amount  qg . The situation for the actual persons will be unchanged. 
However, the mimicker will be hurt, so the self-selection constraint will slacken and there 
is room for a Pareto improvement. d) 
1 2 ~ ~ ~ g g g g
m < < < . In this case both actual persons 
and the mimicker are constrained. q is indeterminate by reasoning similar to that under i. 
We deduce that nothing can be gained by having a positive price.  
  It follows from Proposition 2 that only if   0 ~ >
i
L g  can the economic situation be 
improved by using the price instrument. However, as will be shown below this is a 
necessary, not a sufficient condition.  
 
Proposition 3 : 
Assume  0 ~ >
i
L g . Then there is no gain (or loss) from introducing a positive price as long 
as both types of persons remain rationed.   
 
Proof : For q such that  g g
i £ is strictly binding for both types of persons, the mimicker 
is also rationed since 0 ~ >
i
L g  , the compensated price derivatives are zero, and it follows 
immediately from (13) that  0 / = ¶ L ¶ q .  
 
 
   11 
Proposition 4 :  
Assume  0 ~ >
i
L g  and that both persons are constrained up to price  q . Then, marginally 
increasing the price so that the quantity constraint of one type ( g g
i £ ) is just being 




Suppose it is the quantity constraint for type i that is being relaxed first as the price 
increases. Then, from eq. (13) we see that the change in welfare is given by 
0 / < = ¶ L ¶
hi
q
ig qN q m .  
  It is of interest to compare this result with a corresponding result from the optimal 
commodity tax literature.  Had the good in question been an ordinary private good  x 
with  0 / > ¶ ¶ L x  it would have been optimal to introduce a small tax on the good. (See 
e.g. Christiansen (1984)). This is because in the optimal commodity tax case, at a zero tax 
the size of the deadweight loss from a marginal tax would be of second order, whereas 
the benefits from the slackening of the self-selection constraint would be a first order 
effect. For a publicly provided excludable public good it is the other way around.  
Since the marginal cost of providing one more unit o f g  to a person is zero as 
long as the person is not constrained, the price in our model resembles a tax. However, in 
our model, if  0 ~ > L g , there would be a range of the price where there is neither a gain nor 
a loss from having a positive price. This holds as long as both persons are constrained. 
Then a further increase in  q  that results in the quantity constraint being relaxed for one 
type of person leads to a decrease in welfare due to the deadweight losses created by the 
price. This is quite different from the optimal commodity tax result and is due to the fact 
that we, as  q is marginally increased above  q , come from a regime where the 
individuals are constrained. Looking at eq. (13) we see that at the price  q , where one 
type of person ceases to be constrained,  0
1 = -
m g g  and, initially, there is no gain in 
terms of slackening the self-selection constraint. However, as we increase the price above 
q  the compensated price effects take on negative finite values, implying finite 
deadweight-losses from the price increase and a total decrease in welfare. As the price is 
increased further there will eventually be a difference between 
1 g  and 
m g  such that   12 
1 g g
m >  and an increase in  q penalizes the mimicker more than it hurts the low-skilled 
person. It is then possible that the gain from slackening the self -selection constraint 
outweighs the deadweight losses.  
  We can then identify the possible optima. 
 
Proposition 5 : If 0 ~ >
i
L g the optimum can be of one of the following types : i. Persons of 
type one are not rationed in their demand for the excludable public good and a strictly 
positive price on the good is desirable. Persons of type two may or may not be rationed. 
ii. Both types of persons are rationed in their demand for the excludable public good and 
q assumes any value in the interval {0,  q } where q  is the price at which the rationing 
constraint ceases to bind. Thus we have an infinite number of equivalent optima.  
 
Proof : It is not possible to have an optimum at which only type one is rationed because 
then, from (13),  0 /
2 2 < = ¶ L ¶
h
q g qN q m . Either type one is not  rationed or both types are 
rationed. If type one is not rationed it follows from (14) that q is positive since the right 
hand side is then negative and the compensated price derivative appearing on the left 
hand side is also negative. If both types are rationed, the first order condition that 
0 / = ¶ L ¶ q  holds for the given price interval according to proposition 3.   
 
We note that under the conditions of the model the price is within certain limits 
arbitrary. However, there is also an administrative cost of collecting a price which in 
practice will rule out indifference between a zero and a non-zero price. 
Combining proposition 4 and proposition 5 we note that a regime with a price that 
prevents rationing must be characterised by a price which is set discretely above the price 
at which the rationing constraint ceases to bind. Let us see how this may happen. 
Consider the case described in proposition 4. Departing from the price  q and then 
increasing the price will at first reduce efficiency as stated by proposition 4. But as q is 
increased and the g-consumption of person 1 declines a discrepancy between 
1 g and 
m g  
will occur. This discrepancy makes it possible to use the price q as a device for relaxing 
the self-selection constraint. On the other hand increasing  q will discourage the   13 
consumption of g and distort the allocation. In order to obtain an efficiency gain from 
increasing q above  q , the benefits from softening the self-selection constraint must not 
only outweigh the cost of further distortions beyond some point, but it must also 
outweigh the latter by a margin which offsets the initial loss from increasing q.  In this 
sense one may argue that there is a relatively weak case for regime i of proposition 5. 
We may also note that the two effects discussed above are not entirely 
independent. One way that an increase in q may strongly discourage the consumption of 
g by person one and thus create a discrepancy between 
1 g and 
m g is through a strong 
substitution effect, but this will also add to the consumption distortion and thus create a 
countervailing deadweight loss.  
  It follows from our results that the welfare level can follow three different types 
of paths as q  is being increased. These are depicted in the figures 1a-c below. We 
illustrate how the welfare of individual one changes with the level of  q,  keeping the 
utility of person 2 constant. As q is increased beyond a certain level efficiency declines 
and may never rise again (fig. 1a). For other properties of the economy efficiency may 
start picking up again at some level of q, but may never fully recover, and keeping q 
sufficiently low is optimal (fig. 1b). Only in the last case (fig 1c) does optimality require 
a strictly positive price. In this case the benefits of the slackening of the self-selection 
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 In a companion paper (Blomquist and Christiansen (2001)) we have examined 
further the conditions that are conducive to a strictly positive price as illustrated in Fig. 
1c. We find that on the whole strong income and labour effects and weak substitution 
effects on the demand for 
1 g  as well as comparatively flat indifference curves for the 
mimicker in  Y,B-space are conducive to the outcome in Fig. 1c. Such conditions will 
ensure that 
1 g declines strongly in the former interval where utility is decreasing so that  
one gets to a position where the slackening of the self-selection constraint starts to 
dominate without sacrificing too much utility on the way.  They will also imply that 
utility increases strongly beyond the local utility minimum. 
 
We next consider the rule for the optimal quantity of public good provison. To 
accomplish this we rewrite eq. (10) as: 
q
0 W  
W
q
0 W  
q  
W  15 
 
0 ) ( ) (
2 2 1 1 2 1 = + + - - + + g g
m
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For an individual with consumption  g g
i £ ~ , 
i
g g   and 
i
g V   are zero.  For an individual 
where the constraint is binding it will be true that 
1








g  will always vanish. We can therefore rewrite the expression as: 
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g - =  which is zero if the person is not rationed. 
Inserting this result and dividing through by  m  and rearranging we obtain:    
               
) ( ) (
2 2 1 1 1 * 2 2 2 1 1 1
g g gB
m
gB gB gB gB g N g N q MRS MRS MRT q N MRS N q N MRS N + - - + = - + - m                                                                              
                                                                                                                                       (19) 
 
We now consider the interpretation  of  (19) under various assumptions. 
 
Proposition 6. If  0 ~ =
i
L g  the Samuelson rule ￿ = MRT MRS  applies. 
   16 
Proof:  The fact that  0 ~ =
i
L g  implies that  2 1 ~ ~ ~ g g g m < = . It also implies that 
m
gB gB MRS MRS = 1 . Hence, the self-selection term in eq. (19) vanishes. From proposition 
1 we know that 
2 ~ g g £ . Suppose first that 
2 1 ~ ~ g g g £ < , i.e., that the type one individual 
is not rationed. This implies that the Hicksian substitution effect is negative. It follows 
from eq. (14) that 0 = q . Hence, the  q-terms in (19) vanishes. Suppose next that 
2 1 ~ ~ g g g < < , that is, both types are rationed. Then  1
2 1 = = g g g g and the q-terms cancel 
out. This implies that we are left with the Samuelson rule. 
 
Proposition 7: If  0 ~ <
i
L g  the rule for provision of the public good takes the form: 
 
) (
1 * 2 2 1 1
gB
m
gB gB gB gB MRS MRS MRT MRS N MRS N - + = + m  
 
 
Proof: If  0 ~ <
i
L g  it will be true that 
1 ~ ~ g g
m < ,  
2 ~ ~ g g




gB MRS MRS - <0. If at 
least one of the actual persons is not rationed it follows from eq. (14) that q is zero. If 
both actual persons are rationed  1
2 1 = = g g g g  and the q-terms will cancel out. Hence, the 
q-terms will always disappear from the expression. However, the self-selection term 
remains.  
 
Proposition 8: If  0 ~ >
i
L g  the following regimes are possible  
i)  Persons of type one and the mimicker are not rationed ( q q > as defined in 
Propostion 5), and persons of type two are rationed. The public provision rule has 
the form  gB gB MRT MRS N =
2 2 . 
ii)  Persons of type one are not rationed ( q q ‡ ), while the mimicker and persons of 
type two are rationed. The public provision rule has the form 
             ) (
* 2 2 q MRS MRT MRS N
m
gB gB gB - + = m . 
iii)  Persons of both types and consequently the mimicker are rationed ( q q < ). The 
public provision rule has the form 
) (
1 * 2 2 1 1
gB
m
gB gB gB gB MRS MRS MRT MRS N MRS N - + = + m  
iv)  No type is actually rationed ( q q > ). Only the mimicker is rationed. The public 
provision rule has the form   17 
) (
1 * 2 2 1 1
gB
m
gB gB gB gB MRS MRS MRT MRS N MRS N - + = + m .  
 
The last case is a special one. Since  } ~ , ~ max{
2 1 g g g £ , this case emerges only if we have 
the very special coincidence that  . ~ ~ 2 1 g g g = =  Then there can only be a loss from 
increasing g. However, it is possible to reduce g by one unit, which will imply that both 
types of persons and the mimicker have to reduce consumption by one unit, and the 
production cost is reduced
11. Optimality requires that there is no net from such a cutback 
as prescribed by the optimality condition above. 
The intuition for the results above is pretty straightforward in most cases. There is 
a gain from deviating from the Samuelson rule if by doing so one succeeds in relaxing the 
self- selection constraint. This will happen if the low-ability person and the mimicker 
behave differently and can be discriminated between. If the mimicker, enjoying more 
leisure, has a lower marginal valuation of g as in Proposition 7, the public good should be 
oversupplied compared to the Samuelson rule. Suppose that departing from the 
Samuelson optimum, an additional unit of  g is supplied. The high- and low-ability 
persons are charged through their tax liabilities to be left equally well off. Then the 
mimicker is made worse off as his lower valuation of g does not compensate for the tax 
increase. Mimicking is being deterred. However, if the mimicker’s valuation exceeds that 
of the low-ability person the mimicker will gain from a tax-paid increase in g, but will be 
made worse off if  g is decreased. Hence g should be undersupplied relative to the 
Samuelson rule as prescribed by Proposition 8 ii-iv.  
  If they have the same valuation of g, as in Proposition 6, a change in the supply of 
g and compensating tax changes will not discriminate between the two. Nothing can be 
gained by deviating from the Samuelson rule as stated by Proposition 6. 
  A special case arises when the low-ability type is not rationed. Then an increase 
in the provision of g will not affect the consumption of this type and the sum of marginal 
benefits of increasing g is equal to the sum taken solely across type two individuals. If the 
low ability type and the mimicker are both left unaffected by an increase in  g, no 
discrimination of the mimicker can be achieved, we have a special case of the Samuelson 
                                                                   
11 Mathematically the g-function is not differentiable at g as a kink arises when the demand function hit the 
rationing constraint.    18 
rule as in case i of Proposition 8. If relaxing the mimicking constraint is possible case ii 
gives us a special case iii in Proposition 8.   
 
4. Excludable intermediate public good 
We shall consider the same two-type, asymmetric information model as above with the 
following qualifications. An excludable public good is used as an intermediate good in 
the production sector, but there is no public good in the consumption bundle. 
  There are two consumer goods. We assume that each good is provided by 
producers, each producing a fixed quantity normalised to unity. Let i c be the labour cost in 
efficiency units per unit output of commodity i. The unit cost is assumed to be a function 
of the amount of the public good being used in the production of that commodity. The 
idea is that the use of the public good makes production more efficient and economizes 
on the use of labour.
12 We assume there is free entry and exit of firms. Hence, the 
quantities produced of the two consumption goods vary as the number of firms varies.  
Assuming that each producer has a fixed output is a simplifying assumption. If a 
producer could make any acquired amount of g available at no further cost to all parts of 
the production, there would be economies of scale in production. Concentrating 
production would economise on the cost of acquiring the public good. However, there 
may be other disadvantages from having large production units, but with the cost of 
acquiring g still being one determinant of the optimum size. We do not want to model 
these various factors, which would take us far beyond the focus of our discussion. We 
observe that there are sectors with many producers making use of public goods in their 
production, and we want to consider such a setting without modeling too many details of 
the production structure. 
The producer will minimize the unit cost of production including the cost of 
acquiring i g ,  ( ) q g g c i i i + , implying that in the case of an interior solution 
q ci = ¢ - .                                                                                                  (20) 
                                                                   
12 An alternative perspective would be to assume that the effect of  g is to raise the quality of the goods 
being produced rather than to lower their production cost. Essentially this is the same thing because 
producing higher quality at the same cost can be perceived as producing a larger amount at the same cost, 
which is equivalent to a lower cost per unit.    19 
The cost saving at the margin is equated to the price, or the producer may be rationed 
such that 
( ) q g c i i > ¢ -  and  , g gi =   2 , 1 = i                                                                              (21) 
Neglecting the public input we would have the standard two-type, non-linear 
income tax model with two consumption commodities. (See for instance Edwards et al. 
(1994). We know that in general efficiency can be improved (a Pareto improvement can 
be achieved) by supplementing the income tax with commodity taxes (Christiansen 
(1984), Edwards et al. (1994)). Let us assume that such commodity taxes are in place, let 
i t denote the unit tax imposed on commodity i, and let  i p  be the consumer price. Under 
competitive, free-entry conditions the equilibrium market price equals the producers’ 
marginal and unit cost which consist of the production cost  i c (in terms of efficiency 
labour units), the cost of buying the required input of the public good  ( ) q gi  and the tax. 
( ) i i i i i t q g g c p + + =                                                                (22) 
                                                                                        
The Pareto efficiency problem can then be formulated as  
( ) 2 1
1 1 1 , , , max p p Y B V  
w.r.t. 
q t t g Y B Y B , , , , , , , 2 1





2 2 2 , , , V p p Y B V ‡                                                                                             (23) 
 
( ) ( ) 2 1
1 1
2 1
2 2 2 , , , , , , p p Y B V p p Y B V
m ‡                                                                    (24) 
 
( ) ( ) 0 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1
2 2 2 1 1 1 ‡ - + + + + - + - g qx g qx g x t x t B Y N B Y N                            (25) 
 
( ) i i i i t q g g c p
i + + =     2 , 1 = i                                                                                 (26) 
 
( ) q g c i i = ¢ -  and  g gi £ ,  2 , 1 = i                                                                              (27)   20 
or  ( ) q g c i i > ¢ -  and  , g gi =   2 , 1 = i  
 
A necessary condition for a Pareto efficient allocation is that it is impossible to use the 
instruments of the government in such a way that both types of persons are kept equally 
well off while the government revenue is increased. If that were possible the additional 
revenue could be used to increase the disposable income of the high-skilled person. The 
self-selection constraint would not be violated and a Pareto improvement would be 
obtained. We will now focus on such necessary conditions, which will allow us to draw 
some important conclusions about price setting without going through a detailed 
optimisation with respect to all the instruments of the model above.   
We do the following exercise. We consider changes in q and g. At the same time 
we keep the gross and net incomes of both types of persons unchanged and adjust the 
commodity taxes in such a way that the consumer prices of both goods remain the same.  
Then obviously both types of persons stay equally well off, the mimicking constraint 
remains satisfied and demand for the consumer goods is left unchanged. We can then 
concentrate on the effect on government revenue.  
Pegging the consumer prices at fixed values  1 p  and  2 p  the commodity taxes are 
restricted by  
( )
i p t q g g c i i i i = + +    2 , 1 = i                                                                                     (28) 
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i - ¢ - =
¶
¶
                                                                                                             (30) 
Let us then explore how the government revenue is affected by changing q and g subject 
to the constraint imposed above. Taking net and gross incomes and hence the income tax 
revenue as fixed we focus on the net revenue from g and commodity taxes 
 
g x qg x qg x t x t R - + + + = 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1                                                                            (31)   21 
We differentiate with respect to q and then insert the expressions for commodity tax 
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implying that  
- 0 =
dq
dgi  or  0 = ¢ i c .                                                                                             (32) 
 
Either the producer is not rationed, and the price is zero (such that 0 = ¢ i c ), or the producer 
is rationed (such that  0 / = - dq dgi ). 
 











































































x c = 0, 











x c                                                                                       (33) 
We know from above that that q=0 or producers are rationed. If q=0 and there is no 
rationing also  0 = ¢ i c  and (33) does not hold. Hence we realise that producers in both 
sectors are rationed, or one producer is rationed and one producers is at a satiation point 
where  0 = ¢ i c . For a rationed producer  1 / = dg dgi .  
We can conclude that    22 
 
1 2 2 1 1 = ¢ - ¢ - x c x c                                                                                                     (34) 
 
which holds with at least one rationed producer. We note that the gain from using an 
extra unit of g in the production of good i is a cost saving per unit equal to  ' i c - . The 
total cost saving at an output level  i x is then  i i x c ' - . The sum of marginal benefits is then 
equal to the left hand side of (34). The right hand side is the marginal cost of providing g, 
so (34) is the Samuelson rule for an intermediate public good. We can conclude that the 
Samuelson rule is valid
13.  
 
Proposition 9: Producers using the intermediate public good as input should face a zero 
price. Producers in both sectors are rationed ( i g =g) or there is rationing in one sector and 
satiation with respect to the public good in the other. The optimum supply of the 
intermediate public good is the amount which yields production efficiency in the first 
best sense.  
 
If for some reason the desirable commodity taxes are not available there may be a case 
for achieving some of the same effect through a policy that violates production 
efficiency. Suppose it is desirable to increase the price of a commodity, and imposing a 
tax is not feasible. Then by making production in that sector less efficient, the price can 
be increased, but at the expense of production efficiency. However, we shall refrain from 
further analysis of such a regime. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
We have used the Stiglitz-Stern model to study the respective conditions under which it is 
useful or harmful to set a positive price on a publicly provided excludable public good. 
As in the optimal commodity tax literature we find that the potential role of a price is to 
discourage the high-skilled person from mimicking. Therefore, whether the price 
instrument should be used or not hinges on how the evaluation of the public good 
depends on the amount of leisure which is the only feature of consumption distinguishing 
                                                                   
13 Eskeland (2001) showed in a second best model that the optimum amount of a public, but not excludable, 
environmental good benefiting production should satisfy the Samuelson rule.     23 
the high-skilled mimicker from the low-skilled persons. We first consider the case where 
the excludable public god is a final consumer good. We find that it can be gainful to use 
the price instrument only if the demand for the excludable public good increases with the 
amount of leisure. The reason why it may be beneficial in this case is that the mimicker 
has a larger consumption of the excludable public good and is hurt more than a low-
skilled person by a price on the public good. As such this is not a surprising result. 
However, the positive leisure impact is not a sufficient condition for this outcome. Only 
if the demand for the excludable public good increases in leisure and the optimum is such 
that the low-skilled person is not rationed is it desirable to set a positive price on the 
public good. A finding, which is somewhat surprising on intuitive grounds is that even 
when a strictly positive price is optimal, introducing a positive but too low price may be 
harmful compared to charging no price at all (even when we neglect the administrative 
cost of charging a price). We also characterize how the Samuelson rule is modified 
depending on how the demand for the public good varies with the amount of leisure.  
  We have studied the case where the excludable public good is an intermediate 
good in a framework where optimal commodity taxes on the consumer goods are 
available. Given the optimal use of these instruments we find that nothing can be gained 
by using the quantity of the public good or the price on the public good for deterring 
mimicking. The rule for determining the quantity of the public good implies production 
efficiency.   
When a public good is excludable private firms could provide the good. Such 
provision has been studied in Brito and Oakland (1980) and Burns and Walsh (1981). 
They study the case where there is a natural monopoly. Oakland (1974) studied the case 
where the provision is from firms operating under conditions of perfect competition. Both 
forms of provision involve inefficiencies. In the monopoly case we know that the 
quantity in general tends to be too low. In the case with perfect competition the fact that 
there must be a large number of firms means that the public good will not be produced 
under conditions that take full advantage of the fact that it is a public good. However, 
also the public provision scheme involves inefficiencies. It would therefore be of interest 
to compare public provision and provision from private firms. However, we leave that for 
future research.    24 
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